





Abstract This paper concerns the necessary/ contingent dichotomy, the a priori / 
empirical dichotomy and the analytic / synthetic dichotomy. These three dichotomies 
can be combined to produce a tri-dichotomy of eight modal categories. The question 
as to which of these categories house propositions and which don’t is a pivotal 
battleground in the history of analytic philosophy, with key protagonists including 
Descartes, Hume, Kant, Kripke, Putnam and Kaplan. All parties to the debate have 
accepted that some categories are void. This paper argues, to the contrary, that all 
eight categories house propositions—a position I dub ‘octopropositionalism’. 
Examples of propositions belonging to all eight categories are given. 
 
Keywords Analytic ⋅ A Priori ⋅ Necessary ⋅ Hume ⋅  Kant ⋅  Kripke 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper I defend what I frankly admit may appear, on first inspection, to 
be a preposterous position. I say it may appear ‘preposterous’ advisedly, because 
every philosopher I have ever discussed it with has earnestly assured me it is 
preposterous—until, that is, the argument has been explained, whereupon much chin 
rubbing and head scratching ensues. The argument is, I hope the reader will agree, 
quite good. 
The position concerns the three great modal dichotomies: 
 
• The metaphysical dichotomy. A proposition is necessary iff it is impossible 
for it to be false. Otherwise it is contingent. 
• The epistemic dichotomy. A proposition is a priori iff it can be known 
independently of experience. Otherwise it is empirical (or a posteriori). 
• The semantic dichotomy.  A proposition is analytic iff it is true in virtue of 
meaning alone. Otherwise it is synthetic. 
 
These three dichotomies can be combined to produce the tri-dichotomy of 
Figure 1: 
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Figure 1 depicts eight modal categories: 
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NAA1: Necessary, A priori and Analytic 
NAS2:  Necessary, A priori and Synthetic 
NEA3:  Necessary, Empirical and Analytic 
NES4:  Necessary, Empirical and Synthetic 
CAA5:  Contingent, A priori and Analytic 
CAS6:  Contingent, A priori and Synthetic 
CEA7:  Contingent, Empirical and Analytic 
CES8:  Contingent, Empirical and Synthetic 
 
To help the reader keep track of what is going on, the name of each modal 
category consists of both an acronym and a number. 
A modal category ‘has members’ if propositions belonging in that category 
exist. It is ‘empty’ if there are no propositions of that type. For example, NAA1 has 
members iff there is at least one proposition that is necessary, a priori and analytic. 
On the (plausible) assumption that [1] is such a proposition, NAA1 does indeed have 
(at least one) member:1 
 
(1)  All bachelors are unmarried. 
 
The position I will defend is this: 
 
Octopropositionalism: All eight modal categories have members. None is empty. 
 
Why might octopropositionalism appear preposterous? Well, because it flies 
in the face of received opinion going right back to Hume. Hume famously held that 
there are just two types of propositions, relations of ideas and matters of fact. The 
former are (in my terminology) NAA1 propositions, being necessary, a priori and 
analytic. An example is [1]. The latter are CES8 propositions, being contingent, 
empirical and synthetic. An example is [2]: 
 
(2)  The sun will rise tomorrow. 
 
The doctrine that only these two types of propositions exist is ‘Hume’s fork’. 
Octopropositionalism lies at one extremity of a spectrum that has Hume’s fork 
at the other extremity. For Hume, the three modal dichotomies are co-extensive and 
collapse into a single dichotomy—that between relations of ideas and matters of fact. 
For the octopropositionalist, in contrast, the three modal dichotomies are maximally 
non-coextensive: they come apart every which way. 
In arguing for his ‘fork’, Hume (an arch empiricist) was partly motivated by a 
wish to deny that Descartes (the rationalist) was correct in claiming that [3] is a 
priori: 
 
(3) A thinking thing exists. 
 
If Descartes were right about [3] being a priori then, since [3] is contingent 
and synthetic, it would be a CES6 proposition. This Hume takes to be impossible. 
																																																								
1	Here [n] denotes the proposition expressed by statement (n), and [blah blah] denotes the proposition 
expressed by the statement ‘blah blah’. Is this supposed to say blah blah??? 
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Kant argued, contra Hume, that a third category of propositions exist, which 
are necessary and a priori on the one hand, but synthetic on the other, therefore being 
of type NAS2. [4] is an example. 
 
(4)  The world-as-it-appears consists of objects and events arranged in a 
spatiotemporal and causal manifold. 
 
In more recent times, Kripke (1980) produced examples both of propositions 
that are necessary but empirical—e.g., [5]—and of propositions that are contingent 
but a priori—e.g., [6]. The former are members of either NEA3 or NES4, depending 
on whether they are classified as analytic or synthetic. The latter are members of 
either CAA5 or CAS6. 
 
(5)  Water is H2O. 
(6)  Either ‘one meter’ fails to refer, or the length of the Standard Meter 
Bar at time t0 equals one meter.2 
 
Kaplan (1977, pp. 509 & 540) has also argued that [7] is a priori, contingent 
and analytic, making it a CAA5 proposition: 
 
(7) I am here now. 
 
Pulling these ideas together, we obtain the following list of candidate 
members of the different modal categories: 
 
NAA1: Hume’s [1] 
NAS2: Kant’s [4] 
NEA3: -----------  }     Kripke’s [5] goes in one 
NES4: -----------    }     of these two places 
CAA5: Kaplan’s [7], -----------   }     Kripke’s [6] goes in one 
CAS6: Descartes’ [3], -----------   }     of these two places 
CEA7: 
CES8: Hume’s [2] 
 
Thus, even when the ideas of all these philosophers are combined, the 
resulting picture comes nowhere close to vindicating octopropositionalism. In the first 
place, neither Descartes,Kant,Kripke, nor Kaplan provides us with a putative example 
of a CEA7 proposition. In the second place, if Kripke is right then [5] is a member 
either of NEA3 or of NES4, but it can’t be a member of both—which leaves one of 
these two sectors vacant. Third, it is not obvious that the ideas of Descartes, Kant, 
Kripke and Kaplan are compatible and that they can all be accepted conjointly—
which might leave one or more of NAS2, CAA5 or CAS6 empty. 
In summary, although Descartes, Kant, Kripke and Kaplan can each be seen as 
providing reasons to think that propositions are more modally diverse that Hume’s 
fork allows, their ideas are all compatible with the more modest Humean doctrine that 
																																																								
2 I add a clause to cover reference-failure that Kripke doesn’t bother including. Evans’ (1982, p. 31) 
[Julius invented the zip] could serve just as well as Kripke’s [6]. 
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some modal categories are empty.3 It is this more modest doctrine, which has stood 
the test of time down the centuries, which is the target of the octopropositionalist. In 
order to target it successfully the octopropositionalist must show that all the slots in 
the above list can be filled, a task that could well appear impossibly difficult in view 
of philosophy’s history. 
Setting aside the apparent unlikelihood of octopropositionalism’s being true, 
why, if it were true, would its truth matter? Its truth would be important for 
essentially the same reasons that Kripke’s discoveries about propositions like [5] and 
[6] have been important. In demonstrating that empirical necessities and a priori 
contingencies are possible, Kripke showed that there is danger in the common 
practice of treating apriority as a reliable guide to necessity and vice versa. If 
octopropositionalism were correct then the same lesson would apply more generally: 
no modal attribute of a proposition would be a reliable guide to any other. This 
wouldn’t debar us from appealing to heuristics such as ‘if a proposition is synthetic 
then it is empirical’ or ‘if a proposition is necessary then it is analytic’. But it would 
mean that such heuristics would need always to be treated with caution, with a careful 
eye to known classes of counterexamples. 
A closely related reason why the truth of octopropositionalism would matter is 
because of its bearing on what is surely the most central and important concept in 
analytic philosophy—namely, entailment. Three species of entailment can be 
distinguished, as follows.4 (Here the arrow represents the material conditional.) 
 
ϕ metaphysically entails ψ iff ϕ→ψ is necessary. 
ϕ epistemically entails ψ iff ϕ→ψ is a priori. 
ϕ semantically entails ψ iff ϕ→ψ is analytic. 
 
Philosophers rarely distinguish these notions, instead treating them as 
interchangeable. But if octopropositionalism is true then we conflate them at our peril, 
for, since octopropositionalism implies that none of the modal attributes is a reliable 
guide to any other, it also implies that none of these three species of entailment is a 
reliable guide to any other. For instance, if ϕ→ψ were empirical but analytic, then ϕ 
would semantically entail ψ without epistemically entailing it. Or if ϕ→ψ were 
necessary but synthetic, then ϕ would metaphysically entail ψ without semantically 
entailing it. 
§2 explains the strategy I use to argue for octopropositionalism—a strategy 
which involves showing that NAS2, NEA3, and CAA5 propositions exist, and then 
using these propositions as ‘raw ingredients’ for logically constructing members of 
the remaining sectors. §3 presents the case for thinking NAS2 propositions exist. §4 
and §5 do likewise for NEA3 and CAA5 propositions. §6 summarizes how these three 
types of propositions can be combined to fill all eight modal categories. §7 dispenses 
with a possible objection concerning the proper framing of the analytic/synthetic 
distinction. §8 wraps things up. 
 
2. Conjunction and Disjunction 
																																																								
3 Kant explicitly endorsed this doctrine in holding: (i) that empirical analytic propositions are 
impossible (Critique of Pure Reason, B11); and (ii) that the necessary / contingent and a 
priori/empirical distinctions are co-extensional (ibid., B4).  
4 I owe this point in part to (Pollock, 1970, p. 300). 
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My argument for octopropositionalism hinges on the following two all-
important facts, which to the best of my knowledge have heretofore received no 
attention in the literature on modal dichotomies:5 
 
1. Logical operations on a pair of propositions, p and q, can potentially 
yield a proposition that belongs in a different modal category than 
either p or q. 
2. Remarkably enough, propositions belonging to all eight modal 
categories can be manufactured by performing logical operations on 
propositions drawn from just three modal categories. 
 
I now show why 1 and 2 are true. The argument revolves around the following 
six ‘trumping rules’: 
 
The conjunctive rules 
T1. In a conjunction, contingency trumps necessity, in the sense that if either p 
or q is contingent, then ‘p∧q’ is contingent too. 
T2. In a conjunction, empiricalness trumps apriority, in the sense that if either 
p or q is empirical, then ‘p∧q’ is empirical too. 
T3. In a conjunction, syntheticity trumps analyticity, in the sense that if either 
p or q is synthetic, then ‘p∧q’ is synthetic too. 
 
The disjunctive rules 
T4. In a disjunction, necessity trumps contingency, in the sense that if either p 
or q is necessary, then ‘p∨q’ is necessary too. 
T5. In a disjunction, apriority trumps empiricalness, in the sense that if either p 
or q is a priori, then ‘p∨q’ is a priori too. 
T6. In a disjunction, analyticity trumps syntheticity, in the sense that if either p 
or q is analytic, then ‘p∨q’ is analytic too. 
 
For example, let p be any contingent proposition. Since it is possible for p to 
be false, it follows that it is possible for p∧q to be false, irrespective of the identity of 
q (for p∧q will be false if p is). Thus p’s status as a contingent proposition will be 
inherited by p∧q. Thus p∧q can be necessary only if both p and q are necessary. In 
short, contingency trumps necessity within conjunctions. This is what T1 tells us. 
T2, T3, T4, T5 and T6 are easily confirmed using similar examples. 
These trumping rules collectively imply that a conjunction or disjunction can 
potentially belong to a different modal category than either of its conjuncts or 
disjuncts. For example, suppose Kant were right about [4] being a NAS2 proposition, 
and that Kaplan were right about [7] being a CAA5 proposition. The conjunction of 
[4] and [7] is [8]: 
 
(8)  The world-as-it-appears consists of objects and events arranged in a 
spatiotemporal and causal manifold, and I am here now. 
 
[4]’s necessity will be trumped by [7]’s contingency, in accordance with T1—
and so [8] will be contingent. Both [4] and [7] are a priori, so T2 won’t cause 
																																																								
5 For example, they are discussed neither by (G. Russell, 2008) nor by (Juhl & Looms, 2010).  
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apriority to be trumped by empiricalness in this case: i.e., [8] will be a priori like both 
its conjuncts. [7]’s analyticity will be trumped by [4]’s syntheticity, in accordance 
with T3—and so [8] will be synthetic. In short, [8] will be contingent, a priori and 
synthetic, making it a CAS6 proposition. The same considerations apply generally: 
when any NAS2 proposition is conjoined with any CAA5 proposition, the resulting 
conjunction will be a CAS6 proposition. This being so, whomever grants that both 
NAS2 propositions and CAA5 propositions exist must grant that CAS6 propositions 
can be manufactured too. 
Table 1 shows, for any conjunction, p∧q, how the category it belongs to is 
determined by which categories p and q belong to. (The operative trumping rules are 
T1, T2 and T3). 
 
∧ NAA1 NAS2 NEA3 NES4 CAA5 CAS6 CEA7 CES8 
NAA1 NAA1 NAS2 NEA3 NES4 CAA5 CAS6 CEA7 CES8 
NAS2  NAS2 NES4 NES4 CAS6 CAS6 CES8 CES8 
NEA3   NEA3 NES4 CEA7 CES8 CEA7 CES8 
NES4    NES4 CES8 CES8 CES8 CES8 
CAA5     CAA5 CAS6 CEA7 CES8 
CAS6      CAS6 CES8 CES8 
CEA7       CEA7 CES8 
CES8        CES8 
Table 1. 
 
Table 2 does the same for disjunctions (with the operative trumping rules 
being T4, T5 and T6): 
 
∨ NAA1 NAS2 NEA3 NES4 CAA5 CAS6 CEA7 CES8 
NAA1 NAA1 NAA1 NAA1 NAA1 NAA1 NAA1 NAA1 NAA1 
NAS2  NAS2 NAA1 NAS2 NAA1 NAS2 NAA1 NAS2 
NEA3   NEA3 NEA3 NAA1 NAA1 NEA3 NEA3 
NES4    NES4 NAA1 NAS2 NEA3 NES4 
CAA5     CAA5 CAA5 CAA5 CAA5 
CAS6      CAS6 CAA5 CAS6 
CEA7       CEA7 CEA7 
CES8        CES8 
Table 2. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 have been constructed by simply applying the relevant trumping 
rules to each pair of ‘parent’ propositions, in order to deduce the modal status of the 
‘child’ proposition. 
Most entries in these tables are (relatively) uninteresting for one or both of these 
reasons: 
 
(a) The ‘child’ proposition obtained by conjoining or disjoining p with q belongs 
to the same modal category as either p or q. (For instance conjoining a NAS2 
proposition with a NES4 proposition merely yields another NES4 proposition, 
getting us nowhere.) 
(b) The ‘child’ proposition is a Humean NAA1 or CES8 proposition (of which 
bountiful uncontroversial examples already exist). 
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Entries in Table 1 which are not ‘uninteresting’ for either of these reasons are 
indicated in bold. There are only three of them, and they say the following: 
 
Rule 1:  NAS2∧NEA3=NES4 
Rule 2:  NAS2∧CAA5=CAS6 
Rule 3:  NEA3∧CAA5=CEA7 
 
Table 1 also implies the following pair of rules (both of which turn out to be 
useful): 
 
Rule 4: NAS2∧NEA3∧CAA5=CES8 
Rule 5: NES4∧CAS6=CES8 
 
There are likewise three ‘interesting’ entries in Table 2, indicated in bold, 
which say: 
 
Rule 6:  NES4∨CAS6=NAS2 
Rule 7:  NES4∨CEA7=NEA3 
Rule 8:  CAS6∨CEA7=CAA5 
 
Table 2 also tells us that: 
 
Rule 9:  NES4∨CAS6∨CEA7=NAA1 
Rule 10:  NAS2∨NEA3=NAA1 
 
Putting all these rules together, we obtain two ‘recipes’ by which a ‘full 
house’ of all eight types of propositions can be constructed by conjoining and 
disjoining just three ‘raw ingredients’. 
 
Recipe 1. Start with ‘raw ingredients’ consisting of: (i) any NAS2 proposition; 
(ii) any NEA3 proposition; and (iii) any CAA5 proposition. Then construct a ‘full 
house’ as follows: 
 
NAA1: NAS2∨NEA3   (by Rule 10) 
NAS2:  -raw ingredient- 
NEA3:  -raw ingredient- 
NES4:  NAS2∧NEA3   (by Rule 1) 
CAA5:  -raw ingredient- 
CAS6:  NAS2∧CAA5   (by Rule 2) 
CEA7:  NEA3∧CAA5   (by Rule 3) 
CES8:  NAS2∧NEA3∧CAA5  (by Rule 4) 
 
Recipe 2. Start with ‘raw ingredients’ consisting of: (i) any NES4 proposition; 
(ii) any CAS6 proposition; and (iii) any CEA7 proposition. Then construct a ‘full 
house’ as follows: 
 
Douglas Campbell  19/2/2016 1:45 PM
Deleted:  tha
Douglas Campbell  19/2/2016 1:45 PM
Deleted: t
Douglas Campbell  19/2/2016 1:46 PM
Deleted: 
Douglas Campbell  19/2/2016 1:47 PM
Deleted: 
Douglas Campbell  19/2/2016 1:47 PM
Deleted: 
Douglas Campbell  19/2/2016 1:47 PM
Deleted: 
Douglas Campbell  19/2/2016 1:47 PM
Deleted: 
	 8	
NAA1: NES4∨CAS6∨CEA7  (by Rule 9) 
NAS2:  NES4∨CAS6   (by Rule 6) 
NEA3:  NES4∨CEA7   (by Rule 7) 
NES4:  -raw ingredient- 
CAA5:  CAS6∨CEA7   (by Rule 8) 
CAS6:  -raw ingredient- 
CEA7:  -raw ingredient- 
CES8:  NES4∧CAS6   (by Rule 5)6 
 
Let conditions C1 and C2 be defined as follows: 
 
C1: NAS2, NEA3, and CAA5 propositions exist. 
C2: NES4, CAS6, and CEA7 propositions exist. 
 
If C1 obtains, then all eight kinds of propositions can be constructed using 
Recipe 1, so octopropositionalism is true. Likewise if C2 obtains then all eight kinds 
of propositions can be constructed using Recipe 2, so octopropositionalism is true. 
Hence octopropositionalism can be defended either by showing that C1 obtains or by 
showing that C2 obtains. Whoever denies octopropositionalism must deny both that 
C1 obtains and that C2 obtains. 
Notice the dramatic shift in burdens of proof that has just been achieved. It 
might have been thought that an octopropositionalist must argue independently for the 
existence of each of the eight different types of proposition. This would provide her 
opponent with as many as eight independent lines of possible resistance. But it has 
just been shown that in practice the octopropositionalist only needs to demonstrate 
that three types of propositions exist, for she can then use these three to construct the 
other five. Moreover she even has a choice as to which three raw ingredients to start 
with: NAS2, NEA3 and CAA5, if she uses Recipe 1, or NES4, CAS6 and CEA7, if 
she uses Recipe 2. 
That’s the good news for the octopropositionalist. The bad news is that one of 
these two ways of proceeding can be almost immediately discounted. In order to be 
able to use Recipe 2 it would first be necessary to show that condition C2 obtains, 
which would (in part) require demonstrating the existence of some CEA7 proposition. 
As noted in §1, however, plausible examples of CEA7 propositions are decidedly thin 
on the ground. For this reason Recipe 2 is unlikely to be viable. Recipe 1 (which uses 
Rule 3 to construct CEA7 propositions from NEA3 and CAA5 ingredients) will 
therefore be the focus from now on. 
Recipe 1 involves manufacturing propositions that go in some modal 
categories by conjoining or disjoining propositions from other categories. It might be 
objected that this is a sneaky and underhand way of proving the octopropositionalist’s 
case. This I deny.7 Conjoining and disjoining propositions, is, after all, a rather 
philosophically fundamental practice! 
																																																								
6 In practice it is not necessary to construct NAA1 and CES8 propositions using the methods contained 
in Recipes 1 and 2, since uncontroversial examples of such propositions are easily found (e.g., [1] and 
[2]). The rules that these recipes use to construct such propositions—namely, Rules 4, 5, 9 and 10—are 
therefore of much less real significance than the remaining rules—Rules 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8. 
7 I do not deny that it remains an interesting question which categories can be filled by methods other 
than conjunction and disjunction. 
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To be able to use Recipe 1 it is first necessary to show that C1 is satisfied, 
which means demonstrating that its NAS2, NEA3, and CAA5 ‘raw ingredients’ exist. 
The following sections consider these three modal categories in turn. 
 
3. The case for thinking NAS2 propositions exist 
Kant reputedly showed long ago that NAS2 propositions (which are necessary, 
a priori and synthetic) exist. For Kant knowledge of such truths derives from 
awareness of the limits of possible experience, in contrast to analytic knowledge, 
which derives from the law of non-contradiction, and empirical knowledge, which 
derives from the actual contents of experience. ϕ will thus be a Kantian NAS2 
proposition iff ¬ϕ isn’t flatly self-contradictory, but if every state of affairs that the 
rational mind can potentially imagine or experience conforms to certain strictures, 
imposed by the mind’s own structure, that ensure ϕ will be verified and ¬ϕ falsified. 
Kant provided many putative examples of such propositions, including, for 
instance, [4]. Matters might simply be left there. But some of Kant’s examples have 
stood the test of time poorly (e.g., his claim that determinism is a priori and 
necessary), and his examples are generally controversial. (Kantians tend to be 
sympathetic to them, but many other philosophers are not.) [4] is, I believe, a 
plausible example of a NAS2 proposition, for while [4]’s denial is pretty clearly non-
contradictory—making [4] synthetic—it also seems that we cannot but imagine and 
experience reality as having a causal (if not deterministic), and hence temporal, and 
hence spatiotemporal, structure—making [4] necessary and a priori. That said, the 
case for octopropositionalism would still be greatly boosted if the existence of NAS2 
propositions could be demonstrated without relying on [4] or any of Kant’s other 
examples. [4] is a useful ‘Exhibit B’, but the octopropositionalist needs a compelling 
‘Exhibit A’. 
With this in mind, consider [9]: 
 
(9) At least one of LNC (the law of non-contradiction) and LEM (the law of 
the excluded middle) is sound. 
 
LNC says it a logical theorem that no proposition is both true and untrue. 
LEM says it is a logical theorem that every proposition is either true or untrue. Some 
logicians—paraconsistentists—reject LNC, while others—constructivists—reject 
LEM. However no logician rejects both laws, for a ‘logic’ conforming to neither law 
is so inferentially weak as to be no real logic at all.8 
With this in mind, it is clear [9] is necessary, not contingent. If [9] were a 
contingent truth then it would be possible for it to be false, but this is not possible. 
After all, logic is our guide when we judge what is possible and impossible, and [9] 
makes an extraordinarily modest claim about logic itself—a claim so modest that no 
extant logic countenances [9]’s falsity.  
Another way of seeing that [9] is necessary is by noticing that when one 
attempts to conceive of a state of affairs constituting a counterexample to [9], one 
finds one’s mind is unequipped to do what has been asked of it, for one’s imaginative 
capabilities have limits—limits described by logic, and, so in part, by [9]. (In 
Wittgenstein’s words, ‘The truth is, we could not even say of an “unlogical” world 
how it would look’ [Wittgenstein, 1922, §3.031] ). In virtue of the mind having these 
																																																								
8 In the unlikely event of a coherent new logic being discovered that disclaimed both the LNC and 
LEM, we could simply water [9] down by adding to the disjunction some fundamental principle that is 
relied on by this new logic. 
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imaginative limits, [9] is true at every world the mind can coherently imagine—
making it necessary. 
Next, is [9] a priori, or empirical? It is obviously a priori, because deductive 
logic is a source of a priori knowledge if anything is, and all deductive logics assume 
[9]. [9]’s status as an a priori truth can be no less secure than that of the results of 
deductive logic: which is to say, as secure as could ever be. 
Finally, is [9] analytic or synthetic? There is a very strong case to be made for 
thinking it is synthetic. If [9] were analytic then to deny [9] would be to contradict 
oneself. But to deny [9] is, in part, to deny the soundness of LNC itself and so set 
oneself beyond its authority. Those who deny [9] are beyond reason, but unlike some 
who assert both p and ¬p while accepting LNC, they cannot be justly charged with 
contradicting themselves, or with making a logical mistake. They are alogical, not 
illogical. They are not doing logic badly because they are not doing logic at all.  
If [9] were analytic then it would be susceptible to direct logical proof based 
solely on consideration of its meaning. But any purported ‘proof’ of [9] would be 
manifestly question-begging in a way that a derivation of an analytic truth is not. It 
would need to rely, in part, on LNC and LEM—the very laws of thought whose 
soundness is in question when a proof of [9] is being sought. The essential point here 
has been made many times down the ages—by Aristotle (Metaphysics, IV, 4), Leibniz 
(1973, p. 93), Lewis Carol (1895), Frege (1964, p. 15), and Russell (1912, p. 72) 
among others: viz., logic can’t lift itself by its own bootstraps; it can’t validate its own 
foundational principles except on pain of vicious circularity. All logical analysis 
presupposes certain foundational laws of thought, notably LNC and/or LEM, which 
are therefore not themselves susceptible of being logically proved. Propositions, like 
[9], that assert the soundness of these laws of thought are therefore ‘pre-analytic’. 
Their truth must be assumed before we can even begin to make sense of there being 
such things as ‘analytic truths’ in the first place. Thus they are synthetic. 
But if [9] is not analytic—if it is invulnerable to being proved by logic—then 
how do we learn a priori that it is true? The answer is that we do so by engaging in 
precisely the kind of transcendental argumentation that, according to Kant, is required 
to uncover a priori synthetic truths. Specifically, we find that the rational mind can 
only coherently imagine, experience and conceive the world as conforming to such 
logical principles as the LNC and LEM, and from this we draw the conclusion that the 
world we cognize and experience (i.e., Kant’s ‘world as it appears’, or ‘phenomenal 
world’) must be such a world. In other words, the rational mind finds itself 
imprisoned in certain ways of thinking, imagining, and experiencing, with logic 
being, so to speak, the science that studies the bars of its prison. Any world that a 
rational mind coherently imagines or experiences must, ipso facto, be a world where 
the ways of thinking that logic describes hold good, which is to say, a world where [9] 
is true. 
This idea—that the laws of thought are known via a transcendental 
deduction—was defended by Schopenhauer (although Schopenhauer does not 
explicitly go on to draw the obvious implication—viz., that the laws of thought are 
Kantian NAS2 propositions): 
 
It is by means of a kind of reflection which I am inclined to call Reason’s self-examination, 
that we know that [the laws of thought, including the LNC and LEM] express the conditions 
of all thinking, and therefore have these conditions for their reason. For, by the fruitlessness of 
its endeavors to think in opposition to these laws, our Reason acknowledges them to be the 
conditions of all possible thinking: we then find out, that it is just as impossible to think in 
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opposition to them, as it is to move the members of our body in a contrary direction to their 
joints. (1974, p. 128) 
 
In sum, whoever denies that NAS2 propositions exist must deny that [9] is 
such a proposition, but this denial would be difficult to motivate. [9] fits the bill of a 
NAS2 proposition perfectly. 
 
4. The case for thinking NEA3 propositions exist 
Consider [5]: 
 
(5)  Water is H2O. 
 
Arguments due to Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1973) strongly suggest that [5] 
is a NEA3 proposition: i.e., that it is necessary and analytic on the one hand, but 
empirical on the other. 
That [5] is empirical is obvious: ‘water’ is a name for the transparent liquid 
that fills the lakes, rivers and oceans on Earth. This substance might conceivably have 
turned out to be something other than H2O when it was subjected to empirical, 
scientific analysis. 
That [5] is necessary was shown by Kripke. ‘Water’ is a rigid designator: it 
refers to the same substance in every possible world where it refers to anything at all. 
‘H2O’ is likewise a rigid designator: it refers in every possible world to samples of a 
certain type of molecule, composed of one oxygen atom and two hydrogen atoms. 
Given both ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ are rigid designators, and given that, as an empirical 
matter of fact, they actually refer to the same substance, it follows that they co-refer 
necessarily, i.e., in every possible world. 
Whether [5] is analytic or synthetic is less straightforward. Kripke’s position 
is unclear. His ‘official’ statement on analyticity is as follows: 
 
At any rate, let’s just make it a matter of stipulation that an analytic statement is, in some 
sense, true by virtue of its meanings and true in all possible worlds by virtue of its meaning. 
Then something which is analytically true will be both necessary and a priori. (That’s sort of 
stipulative.) (1980, p. 39) 
 
Under this characterization of analyticity, analytic propositions must be both 
necessary and a priori, and so cannot be contingent or empirical. The possibility of 
NEA3, CAA5 and CEA7 propositions existing is thereby ruled out tout court. Hence 
[5]—as a necessary, empirical truth—must be classified as a NES4 proposition rather 
than as a NEA3 proposition; i.e., as being synthetic rather than analytic. 
However Kripke is at pains to emphasize that this characterization of 
analyticity is merely stipulative (39 & 56n). He makes no attempt to argue for it or 
motivate it. Moreover, other of Kripke’s comments tell strongly in favor of 
classifying [5] as analytic. For instance he writes: 
 
When I say that a designator is rigid, and designates the same thing in all possible worlds, I 
mean that, as used in our language, it stands for that thing, when we talk about counterfactual 
situations. I don’t mean, of course, that there mightn’t be counterfactual situations in which in 
the other possible worlds people actually spoke a different language. (1980, p. 77, his italics) 
 
Here Kripke is implying that counterfactual people who, say, use the term 
‘water’ to designate something other than H2O, are to be regarded as speaking a 
different language than us. Under this way of conceiving matters, ‘Water is H2O’ 
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cannot fail to express a truth when uttered by those who speak our language. [5] is 
therefore a truth of language, and so ‘analytic’ in one perfectly clear and reasonable 
sense of the term. 
However the case for thinking that [5] is analytic emerges most clearly in the 
work, not of Kripke, but of Putnam. Putnam (1973) has us consider the case of Oscar, 
who inhabits Earth, and Toscar, who inhabits another planet, Twin Earth. Both use the 
term ‘water’ to rigidly designate the substance that is actually the dominant 
transparent liquid on their own home planet. In Oscar’s case this liquid is H2O. In 
Toscar’s case it is a different chemical compound altogether, ‘XYZ’, which is, 
however, superficially indistinguishable from H2O. Oscar and Toscar are molecule-
for-molecule doppelgangers of each other, but Putnam argues that they nevertheless 
mean quite different things when they say ‘Water is H2O’, for they express different 
propositions. The proposition Oscar expresses is a necessary truth, extensionally 
equivalent to [H2O is H2O]. The proposition Toscar expresses is instead a necessary 
falsehood, extensionally equivalent to [XYZ is H2O]. Of course, since Oscar and 
Toscar are exactly alike internally, this difference in what they mean is not reflected 
by any underlying difference in their internal psychologies. For this reason, neither 
Oscar nor Toscar can use a priori reflection to ‘read off’ the meaning and truth-
conditional import of the proposition expressed by saying ‘Water is H2O’. Thus [5] is 
empirical, rather than a priori. But still, Putnam insists, when Oscar says ‘water’ he 
means H2O, not XYZ. 
For Putnam the moral of Twin Earth is that semantic externalism is true—i.e., 
that ‘“meanings” just ain’t in the head!’ (1973, p. 704, his italics). If this is right—if 
the word ‘water’, in our mouths, means H2O despite the truth of the ‘water=H2O’ 
identity being inaccessible to a priori reflection—then [5] is true in virtue of meaning 
alone, and so analytic despite being empirical. Putnam doesn’t put it this way himself, 
but it is a nigh on unavoidable, if little noticed, implication of semantic externalism.9 
 
5. The case for thinking CAA5 propositions exist 
As mentioned in §1, prospective examples of CAA5 propositions—i.e., 
propositions that are contingent, a priori and analytic—include both Kripke’s [6] and 
Kaplan’s [7]: 
 
(6)  Either ‘one meter’ fails to refer, or the length of the Standard Meter 
Bar at time t0 equals one meter. 
(7) I am here now. 
 
There are, I believe, very strong grounds for classifying both [6] and [7] as 
CAA5 propositions, but I only need one example, so I will focus on [7]. The case for 
holding [7] to be a CAA5 proposition—as articulated by Kaplan (1977) and G. 
Russell (2008)—is straightforward. [7] is (surely) a priori because mere rational 
reflection suffices to establish that ‘I am here now’ is (actually) true, and no possible 
experience could disconfirm this claim. [7] is (surely) analytic because the meanings 
of the terms “I”, “am”, “here”, and “now” suffice by themselves to determine that [7] 
is (actually) true. Finally, [7] is (surely) contingent because although it is actually true 
																																																								
9 G. Russell (2008, pp. xi, 39–40, 67–68) notes the implication, and goes to considerable trouble to 
define the analytic/synthetic distinction in such a way as to avoid it. However, although she denies that 
Kripkean empirical necessities like [5] are analytic, she nonetheless grants that NEA3 propositions 
exist (p. 68), which is all I need. 
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that I am here now, counterfactually I might not have been. (It is possible I could 
have been somewhere else now, instead.) 
 
6. Filling all eight modal categories 
If what has been said above is right then all eight modal categories can be 
filled, using Recipe 1, as follows: 
 
NAA1: At least one of LNC and LEM is sound, or water is H2O 
NAS2:  At least one of LNC and LEM is sound 
NEA3:  Water is H2O 
NES4:   At least one of LNC and LEM is sound, and water is H2O 
CAA5:  I am here now. 
CAS6:   At least one of LNC and LEM is sound and I am here now 
CEA7:   Water is H2O and I am here now 
CES8:   At least one of LNC and LEM is sound, and water is H2O, and I 
am here now. 
 
 Octopropositionalism is thereby vindicated. 
 
7. Defining analyticity 
A possible objection to the foregoing argument for octopropositionalism 
concerns a lack of clarity around the analytic/synthetic distinction. Perhaps—the 
objection goes—there is a way of framing the distinction under which [9] is a NAS2 
proposition, and a way of framing it under which [5] is a NEA3 proposition, and a 
way of framing it under which [7] is a CAA5 proposition. But—the objection 
continues—it is not obvious that these ways of framing the distinction are one and the 
same. There might not be any single plausible way of characterizing the 
analytic/synthetic distinction that implies that [9] is synthetic and that both [5] and [7] 
are analytic.10 
In tackling this objection I now examine the analytic/synthetic distinction in 
greater detail. Here is the traditional formulation: 
 
AnSyn1:  A proposition is ‘analytic’ iff it is true in virtue of meaning alone. 
Otherwise it is ‘synthetic’. 
 
AnSyn1 is imprecisely worded. Three ambiguities that need resolving are 
these: 
1. AnSyn1 mentions a proposition’s being ‘true’ in virtue of meaning alone. 
But is the truth-value in question the proposition’s truth-value in the actual world, or 
its truth-value at all possible worlds? 11 Depending on the answer, AnSyn1 unpacks 
into either AnSyn2 or AnSyn3: 
 
AnSyn2: A proposition is ‘analytic’ iff it is actually true in virtue of meaning 
alone. Otherwise it is ‘synthetic’. 
																																																								
10 Does this issue also arise with respect to the other modal dichotomies? It appears not. It seems clear 
that under any remotely tenable way of drawing the necessary/contingent distinction, [9] and [5] will 
come out as necessary, while [7] will come out as contingent. It also appears that under any tenable 
way of drawing the a priori/empirical distinction, [9] and [7] will come out as a priori, while [5] will 
come out as empirical. 
11 G. Russell (2008, 41 & 52-57) notes the same ambiguity.	




AnSyn3:  A proposition is ‘analytic’ iff it is necessarily true in virtue of 
meaning alone. Otherwise it is ‘synthetic’. 
 
AnSyn3 forbids the existence of CAA5 and CEA7 propositions (i.e., 
propositions that are contingent but analytic), thereby immediately implying the 
octopropositionalism is false. It does this because it makes analyticity a subspecies of 
necessity. AnSyn2, in contrast, is compatible with certain contingent truths, such as 
[6] and [7], being analytic (for [6] and [7] are actually true—if not necessarily true—
in virtue of meaning alone). 
The octopropositionalist must therefore opt for AnSyn2 in preference to 
AnSyn3. 
2. Kripke and Putnam’s examples may be taken as showing that there are two 
kinds of meaning associated with a proposition, these being: (i) a narrow meaning 
that is fully accessible to a priori refection but which doesn’t always fully determine a 
proposition’s truth-value at a possible world; and (ii) a wide meaning that is 
sometimes inaccessible to a priori reflection, but which is fully truth-functional. 
AnSyn2 (like AnSyn1, from which it is descended) mentions the ‘meaning’ 
associated with a proposition, but without specifying which kind of meaning is 
relevant—narrow, or wide. It can be precisified (is this a word?)to yield either 
AnSyn4 or AnSyn5: 
 
AnSyn4: A proposition is ‘analytic’ iff it is actually true in virtue of narrow 
meaning alone. Otherwise it is ‘synthetic’. 
 
AnSyn5: A proposition is ‘analytic’ iff it is actually true in virtue of wide 
meaning alone. Otherwise it is ‘synthetic’. 
 
According to AnSyn4, the kind of ‘meaning’ that feeds into analyticity is 
‘narrow’ meaning, which just is the kind of meaning that is accessible to a priori 
reflection. This turns analyticity into a subspecies of apriority. AnSyn4 therefore 
forbids the existence of NEA3 and CEA7 propositions (i.e., propositions that are 
empirical but analytic), so implying the falsity of octopropositionalism. AnSyn5, on 
the other hand, being classified as analytic, is fully consistent with certain empirical 
propositions, like [5]: for although [5]’s narrow meaning doesn’t suffice to ensure that 
[5] is actually true, its wide meaning does. 
The octopropositionalist must therefore opt for AnSyn5 in preference to 
AnSyn4. 
3. AnSyn5 (like AnSyn1 and AnSyn2, from which it is descended) speaks of a 
proposition being true in virtue of meaning alone. How precisely are the italicized 
parts of this statement to be understood? On a rough first pass, the answer is that if a 
proposition is analytic then its truth can be logically deduced from premises that 
concern only the meaning of its constituent terms or concepts. But is just any logical 
deduction acceptable, even a circular and question-begging deduction devoid of 
genuine persuasive force, or must the deduction be non-question-begging? Depending 
on the answer, AnSyn5 unpacks into either AnSyn6 or AnSyn7: 
 
AnSyn6: A proposition is ‘analytic’ iff the conclusion that it is actually true 
can be deduced from premises describing its wide meaning. Otherwise it is 
‘synthetic’. 
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AnSyn7: A proposition is ‘analytic’ iff the conclusion that it is actually true 
can be derived, via a non-question-begging deduction, from premises describing its 
wide meaning. Otherwise it is ‘synthetic’. 
 
In §3 I maintained that [9] appears to be a clear-cut example of a NAS2 
proposition: 
 
(9) At least one of LNC and LEM is sound. 
 
But AnSyn6 implies, instead, that [9] is an analytic, NAA1 proposition. It 
implies this because (as discussed in §3) all extant logics have LNC and/or LEM 
included among their laws of inference. The soundness of LNC and/or LEM, and 
hence the truth of [9], is therefore trivially provable in any logic, by simply invoking 
LNC and/or LEM themselves—the very inference rules whose soundness is in 
question. Such a proof is, of course, worthless for persuasive purposes, since it 
presupposes that which is being proved, but AnSyn6 doesn’t contain any prohibition 
against such question-begging proofs. AnSyn7, in contrast, does contain such a 
prohibition. For this reason [9] is classified as analytic under AnSyn6, but as synthetic 
under AnSyn7. 
The octopropositionalist can therefore hold up [9] as an example of a NAS2 
proposition only if she repudiates AnSyn6 and endorses AnSyn7 instead. 
According to the objection to octopropositionalism presently under 
consideration there is no plausible way of framing the analytic/synthetic distinction 
under which all of Recipe 1’s raw ingredients (i.e., NAS2, NEA3 and CAA5 
propositions) exist. For reasons just explained, AnSyn7 is consistent with the conjoint 
existence of all these raw ingredients. So—so far, so good. However, the question still 
remains as to whether AnSyn7 offers a plausible construal of the analytic/synthetic 
distinction. It is, after all, one thing to show that the distinction can be gerrymandered 
to give the octopropositionalist the result she needs, but quite another to show that this 
construal of the distinction is philosophically well-motivated and preferable to rival 
construals. 
Four reasons to think that we should use the terms ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ in 
the way AnSyn7 prescribes are these: 
1. AnSyn7 is, at the very least, fully consistent with the traditional way of 
framing the analytic/synthetic distinction—namely, AnSyn1—for it amounts to a 
disambiguated version of AnSyn1. 
2. AnSyn7 improves significantly on rival ways of understanding the 
analytic/synthetic distinction—notably AnSyn3 and AnSyn4—in the respect that it 
doesn’t make it a matter of definitional stipulation that the following doctrines, K1 
and K2, are true: 
 
K1:  All analytic propositions are necessary. None is contingent. 
K2:  All analytic propositions are a priori. None is empirical. 
 
AnSyn3, in contrast, builds the notion of necessity directly into the concept of 
analyticity, thereby trivially implying K1 is true. Likewise, AnSyn4 builds the notion 
of apriority into the concept of analyticity, making K2 a trivial truth. Even Kant—
who introduced the analytic/synthetic distinction into the philosophical lexicon—
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both K1 and K2, but for Kant these doctrines were much more than mere trivial 
‘analytic’ consequences of how analyticity is defined. Rather, he took K1 and K2 to 
be  substantive claims justified by the following pair of insights about the 
interrelationships between meaning, knowledge and possibility:  
 
(i) The meaning (and thus the full truth-conditional import) of a 
thought is accessible to a priori rational reflection. Hence 
analyticity entails apriority (for if a proposition is true in virtue of 
meaning, then a priori reflection is able detect that this is so). 
(ii) A proposition can be knowable a priori only if no possible state of 
affairs in the world could contradict it. Hence apriority entails 
necessity.  
 
Here (i) justifies K2, and (i) and (ii) together justify K1. 
Both (i) and (ii) were accepted as self-evidently correct by philosophers for 
two centuries after the Critique of Pure Reason’s publication, until Putnam 
demolished (i) with his Twin Earth thought experiment and Kripke demolished (ii) 
with his arguments regarding rigid designation in Naming and Necessity. We might 
register these groundbreaking discoveries of Kripke’s and Putnam’s in either of two 
ways. First, we might say that K1 and K2 have turned out to be false—that analytic 
truths can be contingent and/or empirical despite what Kant thought. This is what the 
octopropositionalist does. Second, we might ‘save’ K1 and K2 by moving the 
goalposts (as it were) and redefining analyticity along the lines of AnSyn3 and 
AnSyn4, so as to make it trivially true that no ‘analytic’ proposition can be contingent 
or empirical. To steal a line from Bertrand Russell (1919, 72), the latter approach ‘has 
many advantages; they are the same as the advantages of theft over honest toil’. 
3. AnSyn7 enables Kaplan’s [7] to be classified as analytic—the intuitively 
correct classification (as discussed in §5). It enables Kripke’s [5] to be classified as 
analytic too, and in view of Putnam’s intuitively compelling Twin Earth argument for 
semantic externalism this again appears to be the correct result. (If one endorses 
Putnam’s claims that “meanings ain’t in the head”, and that ‘water’ means H2O, then 
it is difficult to avoid the implication that ‘water is H2O’ is true in virtue of meaning 
alone.) Finally, it enables [9] to be classified as synthetic. Given that [9] concerns the 
soundness of laws of thought presupposed by all logical analysis, there is an 
intuitively compelling case for thinking this classification is right (as discussed in §3). 
In short, AnSyn7 yields intuitively plausible verdicts regarding the semantic statuses 
of propositions. 
4. AnSyn7 supports a useful modal taxonomy. Unlike such alternatives as 
AnSyn3 and AnSyn4, it doesn’t rule out by definitional fiat the possibility of certain 
modal categories of propositions existing. By opening up all eight categories for 
potential use it better enables dissimilar propositions to be pigeonholed appropriately. 
For example, compare Descartes’ [3] with Kaplan’s [7]: 
 
(3) A thinking thing exists 
(7)  I am here now 
 
These propositions are both contingent. If Descartes was right about [3] being 
a priori—and let’s assume for the sake of argument that he was—then [3] and [7] are 
also alike in both being a priori. Now suppose we were to accept AnSyn3. Since both 
[3] and [7] are contingent, and since AnySyn3 implies that a proposition can be 
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analytic only if it is necessary, it implies that both [3] and [7] are synthetic. Hence 
AnSyn3 obliges us to lump [3] and [7] together in the same modal category, CAS6. 
AnSyn7, in contrast, doesn’t arbitrarily force our hand in this way. It enables [3] to be 
classified as a synthetic, CAS6 proposition, and [7] to be classified instead as an 
analytic, CAA5 proposition. It thereby permits us to respect and mark a major point 
of difference between [3] and [7]: namely, whereas mere analysis of meaning suffices 
to establish that [7] is true, the Cartesian a priori deduction that [3] is true has a 
synthetic, performative element (Hintikka, 1962). 
To summarize: AnSyn7 is consistent with the traditional way of framing the 
analytic/synthetic distinction, and yields intuitively plausible verdicts regarding the 
semantic statuses of propositions. Moreover, because it doesn’t impose brute 
definitional restrictions on which combinations of modal attributes can exist, it 
supports a more useful modal taxonomy than rival ways of framing the distinction 
(like AnSyn3 and AnSyn4), and jibes better with how Kant intended the distinction to 
be understood when he first set it up. These are powerful arguments in its favor. 
 
8. Conclusion 
Octopropositionalism flies in the face of received opinion. If one wishes to 
reject it—as I am sure many readers will—then one must either: (a) deny that [9] is a 
NAS2 proposition; or (b) deny that [6] is a NEA3 proposition; or (c) deny that either 
[6] or [7] is a CAA5 proposition. In order to make any of these denials one will 
almost certainly need to repudiate AnSyn7, which will involve explaining why some 
other, rival formulation of the analytic/synthetic distinction is preferable. Perhaps all 
this can be done, but it will be far from trivial. The case for thinking 
octopropositionalism is true is surprisingly robust. The temptation to dismiss it as 
preposterous should be resisted! 
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